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I.
¶1

¶2

¶3

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . . Discoveries." 1 Those words were written on the cusp of the Industrial
Revolution, when "Science and the useful Arts" probably brought to mind steam engines
and cotton mills. Today, the emblematic technology of our "Information Age" is the
computer and associated software, which appears in almost every aspect of our lives.
While some question the policy wisdom of granting "software patents," 2 few question
that computer science falls comfortably within "science and the useful arts." More
controversial is whether so-called "business method patents" are the type of innovation
contemplated by the Constitution or the Patent Act. 3
On November 9, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bilski v. Kappos,
No. 08-964, a case that has "transfixed the business community" and that commentators
have noted has "the makings of a landmark decision in patent law." 4 At issue is the scope
of the word "process" in § 101 of the Patent Act, which limits the scope of patentable
subject matter. 5 A restrictive reading of "process" could greatly limit the availability of
"business method patents," as well as curtailing the scope of patent protection for
information-intensive processes such as software and diagnostic methods. Yet, software
patents present an altogether different set of issues than business methods, and the two
need not be addressed in the same way. Lumping the two together creates a risk that the
patentability of software will be unnecessarily limited.
The Bilski case presents a claim on a process of hedging commodities risks, and
does not, on its face, involve the patentability of software. Petitioner Bilski argues that
any "process" is within the statute so long as it has a "practical application." 6 This
∗

Andrei Iancu is a partner and Peter Gratzinger is an associate at Irell & Manella LLP in Los Angeles,
California. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and do not reflect the views of
Irell & Manella LLP or any of its clients.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
See James Besson & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents (Mar. 2004), available
at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf.
3
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"patents were designed to protect technological innovations, not ideas about the best way to run a
business").
4
Adam Liptak, New Court Term May Give Hints to Views on Regulating Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2009, at A1.
5
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
6
Brief for the Petitioner at 14-15, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30, 2009).
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requirement, he argues, is sufficient to comply with the long-standing doctrine that
excludes natural laws, mathematical principles, or abstract ideas from the scope of
patentable subject matter. 7 Bilski contends that beyond those forbidden areas Congress
intended patentable subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man." 8
Bilski seeks to overturn the decision of the Federal Circuit, which held that his
process for hedging commodity risks was non-statutory. 9 According to the Federal
Circuit, the question before the Court was "whether Applicants' claim recites a
fundamental principle and, if so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that
fundamental principle if allowed." 10 However, the Federal Circuit held that more than a
"practical application" is required to avoid pre-emption of fundamental principles. A
statutory "process," according to the Federal Circuit, must be "tied to a particular
machine or apparatus" or "transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing." 11
Bilski's process for hedging risk, according to the Federal Circuit, fails this "machine-ortransformation" test. 12 While Bilski's process was not written as a software claim, the
"machine or transformation" test on its face could also impact the patentability of
software that, on its own, is not tied to a particular machine nor transform any particular
article.
Respondent, the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), 13 agrees that "laws of
thermodynamics, mathematical formulas, abstract ideas, and other phenomena of nature"
should not be patented. 14 But unlike the Federal Circuit, the PTO sees this as a separate
and distinct inquiry from the "machine-or-transformation" test. 15 The principle
justification for the "machine-or-transformation" test, according to the PTO, is that the
"historical meaning" of "process" demonstrates that "only technological and industrial
processes are patent-eligible." 16
Both Bilski and the PTO therefore agree that, contrary to the Federal Circuit's
holding, the "machine-or-transformation" test is not a particularly good way to avoid
preemption of "fundamental principles." As discussed below, the "machine-ortransformation" test may also not be particularly well suited to achieve the PTO's goal of
excluding processes outside of the traditional notions of "technological" and "industrial"
innovation. If it performs poorly at both of its stated goals, there is a strong argument
that the "machine-or-transformation" test should be abandoned.

7

See id. at 17.
See id. at 19 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
9
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
10
Id. at 954.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 964.
13
In the Petitioner's brief, by convention, the named Respondent is John J. Doll, Acting Under Secretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Acting Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. See Brief for Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30, 2009). In the PTO's brief,
Acting Director Doll is replaced with Director David J. Kappos. See Brief for the Respondent, Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009).
14
Brief for the Respondent at 34, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 16.
8
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Instead of trying to protect "fundamental principles" and curtail "business methods"
with a single test, an alternate approach could be to treat these issues separately. For
example, the Court could adopt Bilski's view that a "practical application" is sufficient to
protect "fundamental principles." And to the extent it agrees with the PTO that it was
Congress' intent to protect only "technological and industrial processes," the Court could,
for example, limit process patents to those whose "practical application" is technological
or industrial, rather than those directed to the rearrangement of human, legal, or financial
relationships. By treating these issues separately, the Court may be able to better tailor
the test for patentable subject matter and overcome some of the criticisms of the
"machine-or-transformation" test.
The "machine-or-transformation" test appears to be rooted in the view that
computational processes are inherently more "abstract" than other types of processes. We
present an alternative view, that computational steps, in and of themselves, are no more
likely to result in the unwarranted preclusion of "fundamental principles" than any other
type of process steps. Under this alternative view, the machine-or-transformation test
may sweep too broadly in excluding computational processes. This seemingly
philosophical issue—whether computations are inherently "abstract"—could have
significant practical implications for the patent system's openness to software patents and
other "Information Age" innovations. Importantly, patents that involve computational
steps, such as software, should not generally be lumped in with business methods.
A.

¶9

Does the "Machine-or-Transformation Test" Identify Industrial and
Technological Applications?

It has been argued that the "machine-or-transformation" test is a clumsy vehicle for
achieving the PTO's goal of limiting the patent system to industrial and technological
applications. Take, for instance, the infamous patent "Method of Exercising a Cat,"
which teaches a method of shining a laser pointer at a wall and "selectively redirecting
said beam out of the cat's immediate reach." 17

17

Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,422,036 col. 3 ll. 66-68 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (issued
Aug. 22, 1995).
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U.S. Pat. No. 5,433,036 Fig. 1

Compare this process to, for example, an improved process for crawling the web. 18
As pointed out in Judge Mayer's dissent in the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski, the
first patent involves a transformation: "the sedentary cat becomes a fit feline." 19 Though
it is not pointed out in Judge Mayer's dissent, it also involves a "particular machine"—the
laser pointer. On the other hand, an improved process for crawling the web may involve
no particular machine-or-transformation of an article, or at least none that count, as
discussed below. The cat exercise method would seem to pass muster under the
"machine-or-transformation" test, while the web crawling method might fail. From the
perspective of industrial and technological innovation, the "machine-or-transformation"
test appears to achieve a backwards result.
¶11
An improved process for crawling the web might have difficulty under the
"machine-or-transformation" test. At best, it could satisfy the test if a general-purpose
computer were considered a "particular machine," or if the manipulation of information
in generic processors and memory elements were considered a "transformation." The
Federal Circuit explicitly declined to take a position on this issue, because the claim in
Bilski did not recite a computer. 20
¶12
The problem with lowering the bar of the "machine-or-transformation" test in this
way is that it becomes trivial in many contexts. If the involvement of a general-purpose
computer were sufficient to make a process statutory, almost any informational process
could be statutory with careful drafting, including Bilski's process for hedging
commodities risk. Such a trivial version of the machine-or-transformation test is also not

¶10

18

A web crawler is a program that automatically finds and downloads documents on the world wide
web, thus making it possible to index and, ultimately, search the web. See e.g., Web crawler system using
parallel queues for queuing data sets having common address and concurrently downloading data
associated with data set in each queue, U.S. Patent No. 6,377,984, col. 1 ll. 34-51 (filed Nov. 2, 1999)
(issued Apr. 23, 2002).
19
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
20
Id. at 962 (declining to state "whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim
to a particular machine").
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a very good way to restrict patent protection to "technological or industrial processes,"
should the Supreme Court choose to do so.
¶13
The PTO's brief argues that Section 101 "should be read to incorporate the
established understanding, reflected in historical practices and in this Court's decisions,
that processes lacking any industrial or technological application are ineligible for patent
protection." 21 Thus, if the Supreme Court determines that Congress did not intend to
allow certain types of process patents, whether related to innovations in finance or feline
fitness, one approach would be to simply define the scope of "industrial or technological
applications" that Congress intended the Patent Act to protect. Focusing on such
"applications" may be a more direct way of implementing any Congressional policy
objective than a litmus test for machines or transformations. Certainly there would be
difficult cases, but getting the arguably easy cases correct, such as the cat exercise and
the web crawling processes, would be a promising start. In any event, it may be that a
test specifically directed to limiting statutory subject matter to "industrial and
technological" applications (or any other field of innovation) would ultimately be more
successful than a dual-purpose test that must also do the work of protecting "fundamental
principles" from unwarranted preclusion.
B.

Does the "Machine-or-Transformation Test" Avoid Preemption of
Fundamental Principles?

¶14

The machine-or-transformation test has also been argued to be an overlyrestrictive means of avoiding the "preemption" of "fundamental principles." The test
appears to exclude, among other things, processes directed to the manipulation of
information. But information-based processes, including computations described using
equations and mathematical terms, may be no more likely to unduly preempt
"fundamental principles" than any other type of process. In this alternate view,
information-based processes, like any other processes, should simply be required to
describe a useful, practical application of a principle.
¶15
The first line of defense against the patenting of "principles" such as laws of nature
and mathematical equations is that a "process" must describe a series of steps, or acts.
After all, neither gravity nor the Pythagorean Theorem are, in and of themselves, a series
of acts.
¶16
In the 1853 case O'Reilly v. Morse, for example, the Supreme Court disallowed a
claim by Samuel Morse for the "the use of the motive power of . . . electro-magnetism,
however developed, for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any
distances." 22 The Court explained that "[i]f this claim can be maintained, it matters not
by what process or machinery the result is accomplished." 23 The Court worried about the
unwarranted preemption of future inventions if such a claim were allowed: "For aught
that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current,
without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's

21

See Brief for the Respondent at 25, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009).
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).
23
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
22
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specification." 24 The later invention might be superior, the Court continued, but "the
inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without the permission of
this patentee." 25
Morse expressed the concern that the machine-or-transformation test is supposed to
address, namely, that an overly broad claim might "preempt" all uses of a principle,
known or unknown. The problem with Morse's claim, however, could have been fixed
by a description of concrete acts, rather than merely "the use" of electro-magnetism. If
Morse had reduced his claim to a process, the danger of preemption would have been
avoided, and the "future inventor" would have been free to use a new and better process
for harnessing "the motive power of electro-magnetism."
This was confirmed by the Supreme Court in The Telephone Cases, which upheld
the patentability of Alexander Graham Bell's process for converting electricity to audible
speech. 26 Bell claimed a “method of, and apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other
sounds telegraphically, as herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in
form to the vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds,
substantially as set forth." 27
The Court distinguished Bell's specific process from Morse's overly-broad claim to
"the use" of electro-magnetism. 28 The Court first conceded that it "may be that electricity
cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech except in the way Bell has
discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent gives him its exclusive use for that
purpose." 29 But the Court held that "that does not make his claim one for the use of
electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is connected in his patent. It
will, if true, show more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it will not
invalidate his patent." 30 Critically, the Court recognized that there is nothing inherently
wrong with "preempting" all of the uses of a principle (here, the properties of electricity
that allow it to transmit information), so long as the principle is tied to a "particular
process" that just happens to be the only practical way to harness the principle.
A second line of defense against unwarranted preemption of fundamental principles
is that the practical application of the principle, as embodied in a "particular process,"
must be useful. Unlike the "machine-or-transformation" test, this requirement flows
naturally from the language of Section 101 of the Patent Act, which only allows patents
on processes that are "new and useful." 31 Brenner v. Mansen, a landmark Supreme Court
case regarding the utility requirement, held unpatentable a process of synthesizing a
particular steroid, because there was no definite use for the compound. 32 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that there may be plenty of "contributions to the fund of scientific
information" that do not rise to the level of patentability, and that such basic research
may one day "command the grateful attention of the public." 33 But, according to the
24

Id.
Id.
26
The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
27
Id. at 531.
28
Id. at 535.
29
Id.
30
Id. (emphasis added).
31
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
32
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
33
Id. at 535-36.
25
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Court, "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion." 34 More recently, the Federal Circuit has
confirmed that this doctrine "applies with equal force in the fields of chemistry and
biology as well as in any scientific discipline." 35 The utility requirement ensures that a
purely abstract or academic exercise does not qualify for patent protection.
¶21
Courts have apparently concluded that the requirement that a process’s particular
steps describe a useful, practical application of a principle is sufficient to protect the
principles of physics and chemistry from unwarranted preclusion. It could be argued that
the same is true when the principle is a mathematical one. For example, one application
of the Pythagorean theorem, when implemented as a "process," might look like this:
A method of computing the hypotenuse of a right triangle, comprising:
(a) storing the lengths of the sides of a right triangle in a memory;
(b) computing the square of each side;
(c) summing the squares; and
(d) computing the square root of the sum.

When used in a particular process, the algorithm is already much narrower than a claim to
"the use of the Pythagorean Theorem" generally, which would have innumerable uses
beyond this series of computations. The claim would likely have to be narrower still;
however, to be considered a "useful" application of the theorem, as it stands, it is nothing
more than a mathematical exercise.
¶22
If these computations were part of a larger process with a useful, practical
application, the process could well be one that does not threaten to unduly preempt a
fundamental principle. Furthermore, it is not apparent why the result should be different
if the practical application involved additional steps on a computer (say, a process for
image processing) or steps outside of a computer (say, a process for surveying). Neither
process would appear to violate the preemption principle set forth in Morse and in The
Telephone Cases. That is, future inventors would be free to come up with other uses for
the Pythagorean Theorem, and free to come up with other ways of surveying or image
processing.
¶23
Moreover, if it turned out that the only way to take advantage of the usefulness of
the Pythagorean Theorem to surveying or image processing was through the specific
claimed method, that would "show more clearly the great importance" of the invention,
but would arguably not make it fall outside the bounds of patent protection. 36 The claim
would not appear to be any more unduly preemptive than Alexander Graham Bell's
patent, which the Court admitted may well be the only way to harness the motive power
of electro-magnetism for the transmission of speech.

34

Id. at 536.
In re Fischer, 421 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36
See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888).
35
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If computational steps are no different from other types of process steps, a rule
requiring a useful, practical application may be a superior way to avoid the undue
preclusion of mathematical equations, abstract ideas, and other "fundamental principles"
than the machine-or-transformation test. Specifically, rather than excluding all
information-based processes, the test may be better suited to discriminating between
statutory and non-statutory informational processes. For example, an improved method
for crawling the web might be statutory, even though all of the steps relate to the
manipulation of information. On the other hand, the process for computing a hypotenuse
described above might fail because it is a purely theoretical mathematical exercise and
insufficiently directed to a "practical" application. In either case, a "principle" of
mathematics, like the fact that two sides of a right triangle determine the third, is put on
equal footing with a "principle" of physics, like the ability of electricity to transmit
information, and afforded no greater or lesser protection.
II.

¶25

THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF THE MACHINE OR TRANSFORMATION TEST

The remainder of this Article is concerned with tracing the "machine-ortransformation" test to its conceptual roots. One element that appears to underlie the
machine or transformation test is a suspicion that computational processes are more likely
to preempt fundamental principles than other types of processes. If this suspicion is
unfounded, then the usefulness of the test itself is called into doubt.
A.

¶26

[2010

Before Benson: The Practical Application Framework

For many years, the "practical application" framework was successfully applied to
distinguish natural phenomena and other "principles" from statutory patent claims. For
example, Morse, in its discussion of prior cases, distinguished the unpatentable principle
that hot air promotes combustion, from the patentable machinery for harnessing that
principle. 37 As discussed above, Morse and The Telephone Cases established that the
ability of electricity to transmit information cannot be patented, but a particular method
for harnessing that property can be. In Le Roy v. Tatham, the "principle" at issue was that
lead in a semi-solid state can be welded under extreme heat and pressure. 38 The Court in
Le Roy held that this principle was not patentable but that specific machinery for welding
lead according to this principle might be. 39 In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp., the Court held that a mathematical formula for calculating the optimal angle
between antenna wires for directional propagation of radio waves is not patentable, but an
antenna configured according to the formula might be. 40 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co. held that a mixture of selected strains of bacteria for promoting nitrogen
fixation was ineligible because the bacteria were naturally occurring, noting that the

37
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 114-15 (1854) (discussing Neilson v. Harford, 151 ER 1266
(1841)).
38
See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1853).
39
Id. at 175.
40
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
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question was the patentability of the bacteria themselves, not the "methods of selecting
and testing the [desired] strains." 41
B.

Benson: A Landmark Software Patent Case

¶27

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a landmark software patent case, Gottschalk v.
Benson. 42 In Benson, the applicant claimed a method for converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals. 43 Apparently uncomfortable with a
process consisting largely of computations, the Court lumped in such processes with
naturally-occurring phenomena as being outside the scope of patent laws. 44
¶28
First, the Court declared Benson's process to be a procedure for solving a
"mathematical problem." 45 Benson then discussed some of the cases noted above: Le
Roy, Mackay, and Funk Brothers. 46 While it never said so explicitly, the discussion of
these cases by the Benson Court implied that the claimed "mathematical" process
represented a "principle" somehow comparable to the chemical properties of lead, the
physics of radio waves, or naturally-occurring bacteria.
¶29
Next, the Benson Court turned to the nature of process patents. The Court noted
that the process at issue was so "abstract and sweeping" that the "end use" could "vary
from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law
books for precedents" and "be performed through any existing machinery or futuredevised machinery or without any apparatus." 47 Benson stated that a process step need
not always be tied to a particular machine: in a process step for reducing flour to a
powder, it may be immaterial whether a hammer, a pestle, or a mill is used. 48 But when a
process claim "does not include particular machines," Benson held, "[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article to a different state or thing" is the "clue to the patentability." 49 The
Court gave several examples where such process claims were sustained, including a
process for manufacturing glycerine 50 and a process for expanding metal. 51 The Court,
however, explicitly declined to turn this "clue" into a rule: "We do not hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents." 52 In particular, the Court said, it is not precluding all patents for "any
program servicing a computer." 53 The Court then held that the claimed algorithm came
too close to patenting "an idea":
What we come down to in a nutshell is the following. It is conceded that one
may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the
41

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
43
Id. at 64.
44
Id. at 71-72.
45
Id. at 65.
46
Id. at 67-68.
47
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68.
48
Id. at 70 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
49
Id.
50
Id. (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 721 (1881)).
51
See id. (citing Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909)).
52
See id. at 71.
53
Id.
42
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formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in
this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the
judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.54

C.
¶30

The Input-Output Model

Benson planted the seeds of a conceptual framework that we call in this Article the
"Input-Output" model. As the book "PCs for Dummies" explains, "[w]hen you peel back
all the mumbo jumbo, the computer is nothing more than a gadget that takes input and
then modifies that input to create some form of output." 55
PCs for Dummies Fig. 1-1

¶31

In Benson, however, the steps that modify the data (as well as the "digital
computer" itself) do not count, or at least count less, in converting an idea to an
application. The way to give the computational process a "practical application,"
therefore, is through the inputs and outputs.
¶32
If the input and output are abstract numbers (for example, binary-coded numerals
and pure binary numerals), the process is not patentable. 56 On the other hand, Benson
hints that if the end use or output is limited to a specific physical process, such as the
operation of a train, the process is less abstract and therefore more likely to be
patentable. 57 Benson also lists "verification of drivers' licenses" as a potential end use
that might make a computational process less abstract. 58 In the Input-Output model, data
such as a driver's license number is a more concrete input or output than an undefined
number. To complete the picture, later cases would find that inputs tied to specific
physical measurements make a computational process more "concrete" than processes
where the input can be any type of data. For example, In re Abele, discussed in greater
detail below, found an image processing claim to be statutory when the input was defined
as c-ray data, but not when the input was defined merely as "data." 59

54

Id. at 71-72.
DAN GOOKIN, PCS FOR DUMMIES 10 (11th ed. 2007).
56
See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
57
See id. at 68.
58
Id.
59
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
55
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This sliding scale is illustrated in the figure below, where a computational process
The Input-Output Model
INPUT
Patentable
data from
physical
measurements

data

abstract
numbers

Not Patentable
OUTPUT
abstract
numbers

data

data used to
control machinery

that converts numbers into numbers is deemed an "abstract idea," but a computational
process that takes data representing a physical measurement and provides an output that
is used to control machinery is most likely a statutory application of a principle.
¶34
However, this conceptual framework is flawed because its premise is flawed. The
premise is that computational steps are "principles" that are inherently different from
input or output steps. Like bacteria or laws of physics, they are the "basic tools of
scientific and technological work," 60 "manifestations of the laws of nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none." 61 Yet the assumptions make little sense. First, any
information that can be used in a calculation is physical. As Rolf Landauer, a prominent
IBM researcher and theorist put it,
Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical
representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge,
a hole in a punched card, a mark on paper, or some other equivalent. This ties
the handling of information to all of the possibilities and restriction of our real
physical world, its laws of physics and its storehouse of available parts.62

Performing a calculation, whether with an abacus or with a computer, is necessarily just
as "physical" a process as grinding flour. 63 Second, there is no inherent reason to believe
that a non-statutory algorithm for translating BCD numerals into pure binary numbers is
60

See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
62
Rolf Landauer, The Physical Nature of Information, in MAXWELL'S DEMON 2: ENTROPY, CLASSICAL
AND QUANTUM INFORMATION, COMPUTING 335, 335 (Harvey S. Leff and & Andrew F. Rex, eds., 2003).
63
See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("mental processes," "processes of
human thinking," and "systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone" are not patenteligible subject matter).
61
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more important to "scientific and technological work" or to society in general than, for
example, a statutory antiretroviral drug. To the contrary, many if not most algorithms
will be trivial in comparison. To be sure, the principles behind certain steps in the
process, such as addition and subtraction, are basic to scientific and technological work,
but so are the principles of biochemistry that make a particular drug molecule effective
against a particular target. The principles behind a computational process, and their
importance, should not be conflated with the process itself.
¶35
As a policy matter, too, there are likely better ways to ensure that innovations
which are "too important" are not unreasonably monopolized through the patent system.
For example, Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") provides for compulsory licensing under national patent laws,
provided that there is first an effort to reach agreement on reasonable commercial terms,
and that the patent holder is compensated. 64 In the case of emergency, such as a public
health crisis involving HIV/AIDS, for example, there is no requirement to first attempt to
obtain a commercial license. 65 Such mechanisms are arguably a more sensible and
narrow way of regulating unwanted "preemption" than the Input-Output model.
D.

The Platonic View of Computational Steps

¶36

With respect to concepts that should be "free to all men," the Input-Output model
wrongly assumes that computational steps, more so than other types of processes, are
"discovered" rather than "invented" and are, therefore, the moral birthright of mankind.
This assumption was made explicit in the Supreme Court's next software patent case,
Parker v. Flook, which involved a patent covering a series of computations useful for
controlling a catalytic conversion process. 66 The Supreme Court declared that "a
scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's algorithm, reveals a
relationship that has always existed." 67
¶37
The Supreme Court appears to take the view of Edward Everett, a former President
of Harvard University, who wrote that "[i]n the pure mathematics we contemplate
absolute truths which existed in the divine mind before the morning stars sang together,
and which will continue to exist there, when the last of their radiant host shall have fallen
from heaven." 68 Though Flook's holding that the algorithm had "always existed" 69 was a
bit more terse, the sentiment appeared to be the same.
¶38
The view that mathematical concepts have always existed is commonly attributed
to Plato, and we refer to it in this article as the Platonic view of mathematics. 70 It may
well be that mathematical equations such as the Pythagorean theorem have in some sense

64

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_ e/27-trips.pdf.
65
See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Adopted on
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf.
66
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
67
Id. at 593 n.15 (emphasis added).
68
EDWARD EVERETT, ORATIONS AND SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 514 (1870).
69
Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15.
70
See REUBEN HERSH, WHAT IS MATHEMATICS, REALLY? 9 (1999).
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"always existed." More troubling, however, is extending the Platonic view of
mathematics to any series of computational steps. It is not at all clear, for example, that
the series of computational steps required to calculate the Alternative Minimum Tax or to
crawl the web has "always existed."
¶39
All patents, computational or not, must satisfy the "utility" requirement—that is,
they must work—and therefore, some "principle" is likely involved. The biochemical
mechanisms that make a particular compound effective against HIV are as much of a
"truth" as a mathematical equation that may underlie some set of computations.
Informational processes, therefore, do not seem to be inherently more "principles-based"
than any other processes.
¶40
While the Supreme Court compared the computational process in Benson to a
"scientific truth," 71 an alternative view is that it applied certain mathematical principles
(for example, comparison operations), but that the particular series of steps to convert
BCD number representations to binary representations had not, in fact, "always existed."
Moreover, in this alternative view, the binary translation algorithm was not a pure
mathematical exercise, but rather had a useful, practical application in the operation of a
computer. If this were the case, there would have been no unwarranted preemption of
fundamental principles if the process had been held statutory.
¶41
In some computational processes, such as the hypothetical process for calculating
the Alternative Minimum Tax or for an improved web crawler, it may be readily apparent
that no fundamental principles are in danger of being preempted. In other computational
processes, perhaps including that in Benson, it may require more analysis or even expert
input to determine whether the claimed series of computational steps is a practical
application of mathematical concepts, or whether it comes uncomfortably close to
expressing a Platonic truth. In either case, rather than automatically discarding
computational algorithms, a more discerning approach may be possible, where
mathematical truths are treated with no more and no less deference than laws of physics
and other principles.
III.
¶42

FROM BENSON TO BILSKI: THE INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL COMES FULL CIRCLE

After Benson, the Courts became increasingly open to information-intensive
processes, including software patents, and the Input-Output conceptual model faded. As
concerns grew over the excessive scope of process patents, however, the model came
back in full strength in the Federal Circuit's Bilski decision. The following section traces
the decline and rebirth of the Input-Output conceptual model after Benson up to the
Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski.
A.

¶43

In re Freeman (1978)

The next landmark software process case after Benson was In re Freeman from the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 72 Freeman concerned a claim covering a method
of printing or displaying characters whose meaning is partly dependent on their relative
positions—for example, in a fraction, the numerator conventionally needs to be above the
71
72

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
In re Freeman 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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denominator. The claimed steps consisted of reading input codes and building a "tree
structure of symbols," using a positioning algorithm to compose the symbols in their
proper positions, and displaying the symbols. 73 The claim, in effect, covered a particular
way to perform typesetting using software.
In Freeman, the PTO argued that the claim was nothing more than an algorithm
followed by insufficient "post-solution activity," namely, "a fleeting display on a cathode
ray tube." 74 In other words, the PTO's view was that displaying abstract results on a
monitor was not sufficient "application" in the Input-Output framework. The Freeman
court refused to accept this as the sole criterion. Rather, the court reasoned that if no
mathematical relationship is involved, there is no reason to be concerned with inputs and
outputs. 75 The court in Freeman postulated that Benson must necessarily have only been
referring to mathematical algorithms when placing certain algorithms off limits. The
Freeman court reasoned that "[b]ecause every process may be characterized as a 'step by
step procedure for accomplishing some end, a refusal to recognize that Benson was
concerned only with mathematical algorithms leads to the absurd view that the Court was
reading the word ‘process’ out of the statute." 76
The test articulated in Freeman has two steps. First, determine whether the claim
directly or indirectly recites a "mathematical" algorithm. 77 If it does not, the claim is
statutory. 78 Even if it does contain a mathematical algorithm, however, it might still be
statutory if it does not "wholly preempt" the algorithm. 79 The second step is not welldeveloped in Freeman, but is based on the Input-Output model of looking "outside" the
computational steps in order to avoid preemption. The Freeman court did not reach the
second part of the test; it held that the positioning algorithm at issue did not "recite
process steps which are themselves mathematical calculations, formulae, or equations." 80
The claims were therefore held to be statutory subject matter. 81
By narrowing the forbidden computational algorithms to "mathematical"
algorithms, Freeman appeared to narrow dramatically the type of information-intensive
processes, such as software patents, that would be excluded under the Supreme Court's
holding in Benson.
"Mathematical calculations," "formulae," and "equations"
implemented in software would be off-limits to avoid unfair preemption of truths born
before the morning the stars sang together. Mere software algorithms, on the other hand,
could be freely patented, regardless of "post-solution activity" or other considerations.
This was perhaps a step in the right direction, but as later cases demonstrated, the
test was unworkable and ultimately abandoned.
Distinguishing "mathematical"
algorithms from mere information manipulation, in particular, would turn out to be a
quixotic pursuit.

73

Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1246.
75
Id. at 1245.
76
Id. at 1246.
77
Id. at 1245.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1246.
81
Id.
74
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B.

Parker v. Flook (1978)

Just after Freeman, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Flook. 82 The patent in
Flook described a method of updating a number called an "alarm limit." This
computational method was intended to be used to control the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons, where a variable such as temperature exceeding an "alarm limit" signifies
an abnormal condition. 83 The claimed steps of the process were (1) measuring an
unspecified process variable, (2) using a particular algorithm to calculate an updated
alarm limit value, and (3) updating the alarm limit. 84 The principal difference from the
"abstract" computational algorithm in the Supreme Court's earlier software patent case,
Benson, was that the process in Flook was limited to a particular type of data, namely
"any process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion
of hydrocarbons." 85
¶49
Flook made explicit the apparent assumption in Benson that computational
processes are like laws of physics (i.e., "a relationship that has always existed"). 86 In a
possible nod to Freeman, Flook stated that it is using the word "algorithm" to specifically
mean "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." 87 However, Flook
did not provide any analysis of what separates a "mathematical" algorithm from a merely
computational one. Instead, Flook simply held that "[t]he only novel feature of the
method is a mathematical formula." 88 Because such relationships have "always existed,"
they cannot be patented.
¶50
Next, Flook held that "post-solution activity" cannot transform "an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process." 89 The Supreme Court explained that "the
Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a
patent application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could
be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques." 90 Because the limitation to
catalytic conversion processes could not bring the Flook process within the Patent Act,
the claim was held non-statutory. 91
¶51
Flook embraced the holding of Benson that computational steps may represent an
"unpatentable principle," and added the requirement that to avoid preemption of that
principle, there must be more than mere "post-solution activity." Simply narrowing the
use of the Pythagorean Theorem to surveying techniques is not enough, or in the words of
later courts, "merely reciting the field of use" is insufficient. 92 Thus, Flook reinforced the
Input-Output conceptual model that looks for steps outside of the computational steps to
gauge whether the process is statutory.

¶48

82

437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Id. at 585.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id. at 593 n.15.
87
Id. at 585 n.1 (emphasis added).
88
Id. at 585.
89
Id. at 590.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 596.
92
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
83
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The term "post-solution activity" in Flook can also be read to mean that the noncomputational acts must be novel. In other words, if all of the novelty lies in the
computational steps, the applicant should not be permitted to preclude their use by stating
an obvious use for their output. The dissent in Flook attacked the majority for "importing
into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness." 93 In
fact, as we shall see, a "point of novelty" approach never caught on.
¶53
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this extension of the Input-Output model, which
gives more weight to the inputs and outputs when they form the "point of novelty," can
still have questionable policy implications. Taking the Court's Pythagorean hypothetical,
the patent would be the same and have the same preclusive effect whether the point of
novelty was the formula, the surveying technique, or the idea to combine the two. As for
which type of innovation society should motivate, why reward mathematicians for
coming up with new surveying techniques (which would result in a patentable
combination of a new "application" for a known "principle"), but not reward surveyors
for discovering new computational algorithms to apply to their trade (which would result
in an unpatentable combination of a new "principle" and a known application)? After all,
history tells us that surveyors can be pretty good at math: the survey conducted by Carl
Friedrich Gauss for the government of Hanover stimulated his seminal paper in
differential geometry, Disquisitiones generales circa superficies curva (1828). 94
¶54
Like Benson, Flook notes that prior precedents have only recognized processes
"tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different state or
thing.'" 95 There is no explicit determination in Flook that the algorithm is not "tied to a
particular apparatus" or used to "change materials to a 'different state or thing.'"
However, this bit of dicta later served as part of the basis for formalizing the InputOutput model as the machine-or-transformation test. 96
C.

In re Walter (1980)

¶55

The next significant software process case, In re Walter, made short work of the
Solicitor General's argument that the Supreme Court in Flook had "adopted a 'point of
novelty' approach." 97 "If this approach were to be adopted it would immeasurably
debilitate the patent system," the CCPA pronounced. 98 "We do not believe the Supreme
Court has acted in a manner so potentially destructive." 99
¶56
Instead, the CCPA picked up where it had left off by refining the two-step process
set forth in Freeman. Walter explained that the "common thread" running through prior
decisions is that "a principle of nature or a scientific truth (including any mathematical
algorithm which expresses such a principle or truth) is not the kind of discovery or
invention which the patent laws were designed to protect." 100 The first step, as in

93

Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See GEORGE RASSIAS, THE MATHEMATICAL HERITAGE OF C.F. GAUSS 3 (1991).
95
Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)).
96
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9).
97
618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 765.
94
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Freeman, is to detect the presence of a mathematical algorithm. 101 If no such algorithm is
present, no "scientific truths" are at stake.
Next, Walter refines and fleshes out the second step of the Freeman test:
determining whether the process "wholly preempts" the mathematical algorithm. If the
algorithm is "mathematical," explains Walter, the "claim as a whole must be further
analyzed." If the algorithm "is implemented in a specific manner to define structural
relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine
or limit claim steps (in process claims)," it passes muster under § 101. 102 For example, if
the end product is a "pure number," the claim likely fails the second step of the test, but if
the invention "produces a physical thing," the claim is probably statutory. 103 Under
Walter, the test for preemption is based explicitly on the Input-Output framework.
Walter highlights the difficulty of distinguishing "mathematical" algorithms from
mere information manipulations. 104 The claim at issue is a method of seismic surveying
in which a signal is transmitted into the earth, received at geophone stations, converted to
digital format, and then certain mathematical operations are performed on the data to
make it useful for understanding features of the subsurface structure of the earth. 105 The
claimed computations include "computing Fourier transforms and cross-correlation
utilizing the Cooley-Tukey algorithm as modified by Bergland." 106
Walter spends no time attempting to decipher whether the series of operations is a
"procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem," as opposed to a set of data
manipulations that just happen to involve lots of math. Instead, a footnote explains, "[i]t
is sufficient to note that both the computation of Fourier transforms and the operation of
the Cooley-Tukey algorithm are mathematical exercises or algorithms as defined by the
Supreme Court in [Flook] and [Benson].” 107
Walter holds "the claims themselves are not drawn to methods of or apparatus for
seismic prospecting; they are drawn to improved mathematical methods for interpreting
the results of seismic prospecting." 108 While the claims recite "signals" as their input, the
court found that the signals "may represent either physical quantities or abstract
quantities; the claims do not require one or the other." 109 The claim steps do not produce
a physical thing; they merely manipulate this abstract data. As a result, the claims are
"classic examples of an attempt to embrace the algorithm or scientific truth itself rather
than a particular application," and are therefore non-statutory. 110

101

Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
103
Id.
104
See id. at 758.
105
See id. at 761 n.1.
106
Id. at 761.
107
Id. at 761 n.1.
108
Id. at 769.
109
Id. at 770.
110
Id.
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Diamond v. Diehr (1981)

In 1981, the Supreme Court finally found a software patent it could live with. 111 In
Diamond v. Diehr, the claimed invention was a process for molding raw, uncured
synthetic rubber. 112 It was known in the prior art to calculate the optimal curing time
based on temperature and other variables by means of the Arrhenius equation. 113 The
patentees characterized their contribution to the art as a process for constantly measuring
the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a
computer that repeatedly calculates the cure time based on the Arrhenius equation and
signals when to open the press. 114
The Supreme Court held that this process was statutory subject matter. 115 The
Court stated that the claim involves the transformation of an article into a different state
or thing, and that "[i]ndustrial processes such as this are the types which have historically
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws." 116 The Court further held that
its conclusion "is not altered by the fact that, in several steps of the process, a
mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used." 117 According to
the Court, the patentee did not seek to preempt the use of the Arrhenius equation, but
rather "to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process." 118
The Diehr Court reiterated its holding in Flook that a "particular technological
environment" or "insignificant post-solution activity" will not "transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process." 119 But, by "transforming or reducing an article to a
different state or thing," the Supreme Court held that the claims in Diehr had crossed the
threshold into the types of process that "patent laws were designed to protect." 120 The
Diehr Court also put to rest any possible "point of novelty" approach to § 101 analysis,
holding that it is "inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then
to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis." 121
Different results notwithstanding, the claims at issue in Diehr and Flook were
similar: both concerned a computerized algorithm to monitor and control an industrial
chemical process. Arguably, the process in Diehr was patent-eligible and the process in
Flook was not because Diehr named a specific physical parameter as an input
(temperature) and a specific physical act as an output (open the press), whereas Flook had
only named the type of data to be used as an input (a process variable used in catalytic
conversion) and had not described what to do with the output (the updated alarm limit).
Diehr is a milestone for attempting to define the threshold at which a computationintensive process survives the Input-Output test. But the Input-Output conceptual model
111

See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 178.
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
Id. at 184.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 185.
118
Id. at 187.
119
Id. at 191-92.
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Id. at 192.
121
Id.
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was leading to results that seemed to elevate form over substance. If Flook had simply
named the process variables involved in catalytic conversion, or mentioned a switch that
was tripped at the alarm limit, his process may have been patentable.
¶66
More importantly, Flook and Diehr may have been overly concerned that
computational processes were more likely than other types of processes to lead to the
preemption of fundamental truths. An alternative approach would have been to scrutinize
whether the information manipulation steps were mathematical exercises with no stated
purpose, or whether they were useful, practical applications—that is, steps applied to
solving a problem. If the latter, as both seemed to be, perhaps they would both have been
found statutory.
E.

In re Abele (1982)

¶67

Diehr is the Supreme Court's last word to date on the scope of "process" claims
under Section 101. The nearly three decades of subsequent silence is perhaps one reason
behind the eager anticipation of the Court's decision in Bilski.
¶68
The next significant case, In re Abele, came from the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. 122 The patent in Abele was directed to an improvement in a CAT scan
imaging technique where artifacts on the image are eliminated through the use of a
computerized algorithm. 123 The Abele court focused on the broad process claim 5 which
it found to fall outside of the statutory subject matter of § 101, and a narrower dependent
claim 6 which was held patent-eligible:
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps of
calculating the difference between the local value of the data at a data point in the
field and the average value of the data in a region of the field which surrounds
said point for each point in said field, and
displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray scale at a point in a
picture which corresponds to said data point.
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray attenuation data produced in
a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner. 124

The court applied the two-step test developed in Freeman and Walter. As in Walter, it
did not dwell long on step one, namely, whether the claim recites a "mathematical"
algorithm. 125 Abele noted that each of the claims requires "calculating" a "difference"
and therefore "presents a mathematical formula or sequence of mathematical
operations." 126
122

In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
See id. at 904.
124
Id. at 908.
125
Id. at 907.
126
Id. It is worth emphasizing, once again, that a "mathematical formula" and a "sequence of
mathematical operations" are not the same thing. The Pythagorean theorem is a mathematical formula.
Counting the Alternative Minimum Tax a sequence of mathematical operations (which, incidentally,
123
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Abele then added a further gloss to the second step of the analysis in light of Diehr.
According to Abele, a mathematical algorithm can be statutory if it is "applied in any
manner to physical elements or process steps," provided that "its application is
circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution
activity." 127 Thus, explains Abele, if the subject matter is otherwise statutory without the
algorithm, then it is statutory with the algorithm. 128
¶70
Abele applied this new gloss to Claim 5, an algorithm for processing and displaying
undefined "data,” and Claim 6, where the "data" is limited to X-ray data. The Abele court
held that in Claim 5, the algorithm is "neither explicitly nor implicitly applied to any
certain process," but rather is "directed merely to a mathematical formula." 129 By
contrast, Claim 6 requires the performance of a CAT-scan, even absent the algorithm.
Therefore, according to Abele, "production and detection cannot be considered mere
antecedent steps to obtain values for solving the algorithm." 130 The algorithm is "part of
an overall process which is statutory," and hence, the narrower claim is allowable. 131
¶71
Despite the admonition to consider the "overall process," the Input-Output
conceptual model appears to drive the outcome in Abele, as it did in Benson, Flook and
Diehr. The following table summarizes the "overall process" as well as the inputs and
outputs in each case:
Case

¶72

“Overall Process”

Input

Output

Statutory?

Benson

data translation

BCD numeral

Binary numeral

NO

Flook

catalytic conversion

"process variable"

updated alarm limit

NO

Abele (claim 5)

displaying data

data

display

NO

Abele (claim 6)

CAT scan

X-ray data

display for CAT scanner

YES

Diehr

curing rubber

temperature

signal to open press

YES

The "overall process" inquiry does not appear to produce consistent results. In
particular, the "overall process" of catalytic conversion recited in the Flook patent is
surely just as "statutory" as a CAT-scan. Nonetheless, the claim in Flook was held nonstatutory, while Abele claim 6 was held statutory. The simplest way to understand the
results is to focus on inputs and outputs. When the inputs and outputs are abstract (a
"process variable" input and an "alarm limit" output, or generic data input and generic
display output), the claims have generally been held non-statutory. In contrast, when the
inputs are concrete and tied to physical processes (a temperature input for controlling an
industrial process, or x-ray data to be displayed in conjunction with a CAT scan), the
claims have been held statutory.

involves "calculating" a "difference.") The former may be a "fundamental truth," but the latter is not.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 909.
130
Id. at 908.
131
Id. at 909.

266

Vol. 8:2]

¶73

Andrei Iancu et al.

Abele says that a software process for removing artifacts from an image is
patentable, but the patentee has to describe the source of the image. Presumably, the
patentee would be allowed to claim as many data sources as he could think up—CAT
scans, MRI images, images from the Hubble space telescope—and all of those claims
would be allowable. But claiming the process as to any image source is too broad,
because then some fundamental truth may be preempted. This outcome is based, once
again, on the premise that patents on image processing are more likely to unfairly
preclude fundamental principles than, say, patents on flour processing. There is some
question whether this is the correct premise for determining patentability, especially in
the information age.
F.

¶74

The two-step analysis of (1) determining whether a claim includes a mathematical
algorithm, and (2) if so, whether the "overall process" is statutory, came to be known as
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. 132 The Freeman-Walter-Abele test was applied to five
more process claims by the CCPA and its successor, the Federal Circuit, before it was
effectively abandoned. The five cases are summarized below in table form in terms of
the overall process, inputs, outputs, and holding:
Case
Meyer

“Overall Process”

Input

Output

Statutory?

133

analysis of complex
system

test results

probability of function or
malfunction

NO

134

diagnosing abnormal
condition

laboratory test
results

identification of
abnormal parameters

NO

analyzing electrocardiograph signals

signal related to
heart function

comparison indicating
risk of ventricular
tachycardia

YES

auction

bids

bids corresponding to a
prevailing total price

NO

generating a data
structure

location of medial
axis of physical
object

data structure
representing shape of
physical object

NO

Grams

Arrhythmia

Schrader

135

136

Warmerdam

¶75

The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test (1982-1994)

137

Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., the only one of these
cases in which a claim was found statutory, held that the input signals and output signals
in the claimed process were related to patient's heart function and therefore not
"abstractions." 138 The remaining cases presented inputs and outputs that were apparently
insufficiently tied to concrete physical processes. For example, in Grams, which also
132

See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 949, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the "Freeman-Walter-Abele

test").
133

In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
135
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Carazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
136
In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
137
In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
138
Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1059.
134
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concerned a diagnostic process, the court noted that the "sole physical process step" is the
performance of clinical tests to obtain data, and "[t]he specification does not bulge with
disclosure on those tests." 139 The implication appears to be that a more concretelydefined input may have made the computational steps statutory. 140
¶76
The last two cases in this series are of particular interest because they lead to the
ultimate demise of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, based at least in part on the
recognition that "mathematical" algorithms are very difficult to distinguish from mere
computations. In Schrader, the majority held that the algorithm is "similar to a class of
well-known mathematical optimization procedures commonly applied to business
problems called linear programming," and that a "mathematical algorithm" is therefore
implicit in the claim. 141 The claim was therefore held non-statutory. 142 In a footnote,
however, the court in Schrader admitted that the definition of algorithm is "not
universally agreed," and discusses the problems with identifying "mathematical
algorithms." 143 The dissent in Schrader argues that, in fact, no mathematical algorithm is
claimed: "The only mathematical problem in Schrader's invention is identifying that
combination of bids which yields the highest return, and he does not claim any particular
procedure or formula for solving that problem . . . . One must distinguish the answer to
be found from the method of finding that answer. The latter might be a mathematical
algorithm; the former is not." 144
¶77
In Warmerdam, the Federal Circuit recited the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele
test. 145 Then, citing to Schrader, the court stated, "the difficulty is that there is no clear
agreement as to what is a 'mathematical algorithm', which makes rather dicey the
determination of whether the claim as a whole is no more than that." 146 The court
suggested abandoning these "arbitrary definitional terms" which "deviate from those used
in the statute," and recommended "returning to the language of the statute and the
Supreme Court's basic principles as enunciated in Diehr." 147 In its analysis of the claim,
the Federal Circuit expressly declined to decide whether the process was a "mathematical
algorithm." 148 Instead, finding that the steps involved "nothing more than the
manipulation of basic mathematical constructs," the Federal Circuit held that the claim
was a non-statutory "abstract idea." 149 Warmerdam did not overrule the doctrine that a
"mathematical algorithm" indicates a non-statutory process. But, by calling the rule
"dicey" in its application and declining to utilize it, Warmerdam all but spelled the
demise of the two-step Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
¶78
Warmerdam and Schrader recognized the difficulties with defining "mathematical
algorithm.” Warmerdam did not specify what could make a process involving
computations "concrete" as opposed to "abstract," but one interpretation is that the
139
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method in Warmerdam of "generating a data structure which represents the shape of a
physical object" was too theoretical and did not sufficiently state a "practical"
application. Indeed, this is the direction that the Federal Circuit went in its subsequent
landmark cases on patent eligibility.
G.

Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result (1994-2007)

¶79

The same year that Warmerdam, by all appearances, discarded the FreemanWalter-Abele test, the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Alappat introduced a new
formulation: a statutory process must produce "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."150
The claim at issue in Alappat related to a means for creating a smooth waveform display
in a digital oscilloscope. The claim named a "rasterizer for converting vector list data …
to be displayed on a display" and "means" for several manipulations of that data. 151 The
Federal Circuit gave a nod to Freeman-Walter-Abele in a footnote, but did not apply it.152
Instead, the Federal Circuit noted that many or all of the means elements in the disputed
claim "represent circuitry elements that perform mathematical calculations," and that the
claimed invention as a whole is "directed to a combination of interrelated elements which
combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples into . . . data
to be displayed on a display means." 153 The Federal Circuit held that this was not "a
disembodied mathematical concept" but rather "a specific machine to produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result." 154
¶80
After the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street, 155 the presence of a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result" effectively replaced the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. The
claim at issue in State Street covered "a data processing system for managing a financial
services configuration of a portfolio." 156 Written in means-plus-function terms to cover a
computer system, the claim effectively covered a computer and software used for
maintaining the accounts of a particular type of pooled mutual fund arrangement. 157 The
Court held that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has "little, if any, applicability" in light of
subsequent cases. 158 Under Benson, the Federal Circuit explained, the presence of an
algorithm "may have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory subject matter." 159 After
Diehr and Alappat, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that "the mere fact that a
claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers,
and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter,
unless, of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible
result.'" 160
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Because the claim in State Street was "directed to a machine programmed with the
[accounting] software," and produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result," the
Federal Circuit found that it claimed statutory subject matter. The Federal Circuit stated
that this was sufficient to bring the process within § 101 "even if the useful result is
expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss." 161
Notably, the Federal Circuit rejected the trial court's holding that the claim was an
unpatentable "business method." State Street held that the trial court erred when it
construed the claims to be directed to a process, with each "means" clause representing a
step in that process, because in the Federal Circuit's view, there was sufficient supporting
structure disclosed to qualify the claim as a "machine." 162 Moreover, the Federal Circuit
rejected the idea that business methods are non-statutory, holding that "§101 should not
turn on whether the claimed subject matter does 'business' as opposed to something
else." 163
The "useful, concrete, and tangible result" leaves behind the vexing problems of the
Input-Output conceptual model, including the difficult task of identifying "mathematical"
algorithms. However, it allows for the patentability of any information manipulation
process, with perhaps a trivial additional limitation that the manipulation is done on a
computer. It does not appear to matter whether the application of the process is scientific
measurement (as in Alappat) or mutual fund management (as in State Street), so long as
there is some useful application.
The result was a boom in patent applications covering areas such as financial
software and Internet-based business models, but also criticism from numerous
commentators questioning whether business method patents are a good idea. 164 For
example, commentators questioned whether the traditional rationales for rewarding
innovation through the patent system apply with respect to business methods, or whether
the patent system should stray beyond inventions susceptible to industrial application. 165
The logical consequence of this new scope for process claims played out in In re
Comiskey. 166 In that case, certain claims relating to an arbitration process were held
patent-ineligible because, even if they had a "practical application," they depended
entirely on the use of "mental processes." 167 By contrast, other claims that recited
additional limitations such as "a registration module for enrolling" a person, "an
arbitration module for incorporating arbitration language," and a "means for selecting an
arbitrator from an arbitrator database," were found to claim patentable subject matter. 168
According to the Federal Circuit, these claims, "under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, could require the use of a computer as part of Comiskey's arbitration
system." 169
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¶86

In re Comiskey appears to have presented the lowest bar yet to statutory subject
matter for processes involving the manipulation of information—so long as the steps had
a practical application and "could" be performed in a computer, they were statutory. The
Federal Circuit seemed to believe that any problems caused by its expansive approach in
Comiskey could be solved through traditional patentability requirements such as
obviousness. 170 The court noted that "[t]he routine addition of modern electronics to an
otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness." 171
¶87
Perhaps obviousness will present an alternative path to address the patentability of
claims involving algorithms and the like.172 Yet this effectively bypasses most "subject
matter" analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
H.

In re Bilski (2008)

¶88

The Federal Circuit's Bilski decision was apparently intended to rein in some of the
broad scope of State Street and Comiskey. Bilski's claims cover a method for managing
risk of commodity costs. Claim 1 of Bilski's patent includes steps of "identifying market
participants" and "initiating a series of transactions" among "commodity providers,"
"consumers of said commodity," and "market participants for said commodity." 173
Claim 1 does not include any explicit calculation steps, but implicitly requires a
calculation of price terms: a first rate "based on historical averages," and a second rate
which must "balance[] the risk position" of the transactions. 174 Claim 4, not explicitly
discussed in the Federal Circuit's decision, includes a specific formula for calculating
price. 175
¶89
As noted above, Bilski was not a software process claim: the claimed transactions
were not limited to operation on a computer. 176 Of course, modern commodities traders
rely heavily on computers, and it is likely that the process could have been written to
include software and/or hardware, similar to the claim in State Street. However, because
no "machine" was recited in Bilski's claim, the Federal Circuit decided to "leave to future
cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the
answers to particular questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices
to tie a process claim to a particular machine." 177
¶90
The way that the Federal Circuit decided in Bilski to curtail the broadening scope of
process patents was by returning to a preemption analysis based on an Input-Output
model. After a discussion of Diehr and its precursors, the Federal Court stated that "[t]he
question before us … is whether Applicants' claim recites a fundamental principle and, if
so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if
allowed." 178 The answer to this question, according to Bilski, is to be found in the
170
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"machine-or-transformation" test. The Federal Circuit, as a result, held that a claim is
statutory if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing." 179 Bilski specifically repudiates the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test because the first step, checking for the presence of the
potentially offending "fundamental principle," looks to "individual limitations" rather
than the claim as a whole. 180 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit proposes both to detect the
presence of a "fundamental principle" and to test for preemption of that principle at the
same time through the "machine-or-transformation" test.
The machine-or-transformation test of In re Bilski appears to state the general test
for any process under 35 U.S.C. § 101. It does not explicitly eliminate any particular
category of process, be it a business method or a software patent. The Federal Circuit
explicitly rejected "calls for categorical exclusions beyond those for fundamental
principles already identified by the Supreme Court." 181 Instead, it reaffirmed its
conclusion in State Street that the "so-called 'business method exception' is unlawful,"
and held that "all process claims" are "subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability." 182
Applying the machine-or-transformation test to Bilski's claim, the court held that it
fails the transformation prong: "Purported transformations or manipulations simply of
public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and
they are not representative of physical objects or substances." 183 As noted above, the
claims failed the machine portion of the test because a computer was not recited. 184 The
claim was therefore found to be ineligible for patenting under § 101. 185
Bilski can be seen as both a reinstatement and a refinement of the Input-Output
model. The refinement offered by the Federal Circuit in Bilski is that certain uses of
inputs and outputs, even if they take place outside of the computation steps in the "real
world," do not count to make the process more concrete. According to the Federal
Circuit, "while the claimed process contains physical steps (initiating, identifying), it
does not involve transforming an article into a different state or thing." 186 The dissent
argued that the "transformative" physical steps were ill-defined: "Entering into a
transaction is a physical process: telephone calls are made, meetings are held, and market
participants must physically execute contracts. Market participants go from a state of not
being in a commodity transaction to a state of being in such a transaction. The majority,
however, fails to explain how this sort of physical transformation is insufficient to satisfy
its proposed patent eligibility standard." 187
Perhaps a way to reconcile these views is that contract formation can be a physical
"output" of a set of informational steps (identifying participants, calculating price terms),
but that output is less "concrete" in the sliding scale of the Input-Output test than if an
179
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output is used, for example, to control machinery. Treating a contract as less "real" than
a rubber press may be something of a fiction, but it allows the court to curtail the scope of
business method patents while staying within the Input-Output framework.
¶95
The principal problem, however, is that the Federal Circuit lumped all processes
under the same machine-or-transformation test.
As discussed in this article,
computational processes may not fare well under this test, because computational steps
are regarded as "abstract" and only inputs and outputs tied to the physical world may be
counted toward making a process "concrete." In addition, Bilski holds that certain acts
involving economic activity by humans (such as "initiating a transaction") are also to be
regarded as more abstract and less transformational than, say, opening a rubber press.188
By employing what some might argue is a fiction that deems certain physical acts to be
more "abstract" than others, the machine-or-transformation test appears to curtail
computational (software) processes and "business methods" all in the name of protecting
"fundamental principles."
¶96
Unfortunately, the test may well be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
Whatever the merits of various arguments regarding the patentability of business
methods, the patentability of software processes, which are at the heart of innovation in
our Information Age, at least deserves separate consideration.
IV.

LOOKING AHEAD

¶97

The danger of any dual-purpose device is that, like the spork, it may not be ideally
suited to either task. 189 There may be a similar danger in attempting to achieve too much
with the machine-or-transformation test. A single test based on the Input-Output
conceptual framework may not be the best way both to protect fundamental principles
and to potentially curtail the scope of business method patents.
¶98
It is not at all clear that the goal of avoiding preemption of fundamental principles
is well-served by the machine-or-transformation test, at least in the context of
computational processes. For example, the typesetting algorithm in Freeman might be
held non-statutory under the "machine-or-transformation" test, despite the Freeman
court's recognition that it did not implicate any fundamental principles such as
"mathematical calculations, formulae, or equations." 190 The claims did not recite any
special hardware and could evidently be implemented on any general purpose computer,
which may not pass muster under the "machine" prong (though, again, the Federal Circuit
did not decide the question). 191 And the output, "a fleeting display on a cathode ray
tube," may not be deemed sufficiently transformative. 192 Yet typesetting software, as the
Freeman court recognized, is far removed from the Pythagorean theorem. 193
¶99
Precedent suggests that a narrower test is possible. In Freeman, for example, the
claim was found statutory because the algorithm was deemed non-mathematical. 194 As a
188
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result, the "fleeting" nature of the output did not matter. 195 Subsequent courts, however,
appeared to give up on the project of distinguishing mathematical and non-mathematical
algorithms. 196 Yet a pure Input-Output test, with no attention to the specifics of the
computational steps themselves, may not be ideally suited to the information age where a
great deal of innovation involves computational processes.
So if not all computational algorithms threaten to preempt fundamental principles,
but the "mathematical" litmus test is unworkable, what test can take its place? One way
forward may be to recognize that information processes pose no greater danger of
preempting "fundamental principles" than any other processes. There is arguably nothing
more "abstract" about calculating the time required to cure rubber than about opening a
rubber press. To jump over this conceptual threshold, it may help to visualize the
calculation being performed with an abacus rather than a computer. Under this view that
puts computations on par with any other series of physical acts, so long as the
computational process has a practical application, the fundamental principles may largely
take care of themselves.
In other words, rather than focusing on whether algorithms are "mathematical" or
not, it may be more feasible to focus on separating computational processes that are mere
statements of mathematical truths, from computational processes (whether or not they
include math) that have a "practical application." Critically, the "practical application"
would not necessarily require a transformation of matter, operation of a machine, or any
other physical output. It could include information, such as an index of web pages
resulting from a web crawling method. So long as a principle of nature or a scientific
truth is not preempted, why should these processes be treated differently than any other
process, whether or not they are a machine or they create some physical transformation?
A renewed focus on the nature of the computational steps themselves, rather than the
Inputs and Outputs, may better serve the purpose of protecting fundamental principles
while allowing patent protection to keep up in the information age.
As to the second goal—reining in business method patents—the PTO argues that
the machine-or-transformation test is needed to implement Congress's intent that "only
technological and industrial processes are patent-eligible." 197 Yet a method of exercising
a cat with a laser pointer, which might pass the machine-or-transformation test, would be
regarded by many people as outside of the "technological and industrial" sphere.
The question of whether and how to ban certain subject matter such as "business
methods" is the subject of a vigorous and healthy debate. The key point for the purposes
of this article is that it may be better to treat this as a separate question. If, for example,
the Supreme Court determines that processes centering on contract formation were not
intended to be protected by the Patent Act, such Congressional intent may be better
served if it is implemented separately from a doctrine intended to exclude truths that
existed "before the morning stars sang together." As to the protection of fundamental
principles, as argued above, a narrow test for weeding out mathematical truths, rather
than a broad exclusion based on Inputs and Outputs, may well be sufficient to the task.
The software baby, in other words, should not be thrown out with the business method
bathwater.
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